Thread by Timothy Snyder
Thread
Putin's rule is weakening. 0/
We now regularly hear now from people aside from Putin (for example former prime minister and president Dmitri Medvedev) about the meaning of the war, the catastrophic consequences that await Ukraine and the West, and so forth. This is a sign that Putin is losing control. 1/
Usually the news coverage of such pronouncements focuses on their content. It is tempting to get caught up in the Russian fear propaganda. But the real story is that people aside from Putin now feel authorized to make such proclamations. Before the war there was less of this 2/
The doom propaganda serves a couple of purposes. On the surface, it shows loyalty to Putin. At a time when Russia is losing, the best hope is to convince the West that Russia is somehow unstoppable (which it isn't – like the U.S., its history is littered with defeat in war). 3/
At the same time, the doom propaganda is rhetorical preparation for a power struggle after Putin falls. 4/
If Russia loses the war, the people saying radical things now will have protected themselves. For my part, I tend to see the drastic proclamations as evidence that important Russians think that Russia is losing. 5/
I'm not convinced Medvedev, who for years was seen as the liberal alternative to Putin, believes the antisemitic, anti-Polish, anti-Western hate speech he publishes on Telegram. He's creating a profile that might be useful later (just as his technocrat profile was once useful) 6/
Another interesting example is Ramzan Kadyrov, who has run Chechnya as his own personal satrapy since he helped Putin win the Second Chechen War. Kadyrov commands a kind of personal armed guard that appears alongside the Russian army in its foreign wars. 7/
In Ukraine, Kadyrov's men have arranged matters so as not to have taken very many casualties. From the perspective of his own interests, this makes sense. They are available for a future power struggle in a post-Putin Russia. 8/
Kadyrov now proposes that Russia locate air defense systems in Chechnya. His justification is that Ukraine might attack Chechnya, which is not credible. It sounds more like he is preparing for a post-Putin Russia in which Chechnya would claim independence. 9/
Another sign of weakness for Putin is the army itself. The argument over whether Russia is winning or losing can be made in military terms. 10/
But the army itself is a source of Putin's political strength. The claim of its eternal invincibility is a consistent element of Putin's own propaganda. 11/
Russians might think that Russia is winning the war (I don't). But out there in the real world, on Ukrainian territory, the Russian army is taking losses. 12/
The Russian army is taking losses in equipment and in officers, that threaten its integrity as an institution, not to mention its ability to fulfill its many other missions beyond Ukraine. 13/
Sanctions make this worse. A world-class army is not one that goes hunting in Teheran for drones reverse-engineered from Western technology. But that is where Russia is right now. 14/
Putin can survive the army not being strong. But at a certain point, not being strong becomes not looking strong. 15/
The Russian army is also taking horrible losses in men, which suggests the next sign of Putin's weakness. The Russian state can mobilize its population for war only at the level of emotions, not bodies. 16/
Russian regions are now working hard to find highly-paid "volunteers" who are sent to die with little training. 17/
Putin is clearly afraid that a general mobilization would undo his popularity and bring down his regime. In this sense he is weak. 18/
The Russian state looks fascist at the top, but it lacks the fascist capacity for total war. It has governed thus far by the demobilization of its population, not its mobilization. 19/
The old communist joke went "we pretend to work and you pretend to pay us." In Russia today the reality is something more like "you pretend to win a war and we pretend to show enthusiasm." 20/
Putin has soft support for the war, so long as it is a television show, but cannot count on Russians to risk their actual bodies. 21/
The dramatic rhetoric on Russian television and on the Telegram channels of Russian leaders is thus rather a substitute for than evidence of a national consensus about the war. 22/
So long as everyone says nationalistic things, a certain equilibrium is preserved. But this amounts to everyone bluffing everyone else. 23/
The equilibrium that keeps Putin in power—mastery over rivals, soft support in the population, integrity of the army—is challenged by the realities of an unpredictable, costly war. Putin has been good at keeping us all in a fog. But now he himself seems lost in the fog of war 24/
The trap presented to Putin by rivals, by the public, by the army looks like this: we will all agree with you that we are winning the war, and we will all blame you when if we lose it. This is all clouded by emotion, displacement, and fear. But this is the general picture. 25/
It is not clear how Putin can escape, except by declaring victory. 26/
Putin's gamble, as ever, is that the West will feel the pain faster than he will. This is how his foreign policy works: generate losses for everyone, including Russia, in the hope that the other side will concede first. 27/
Putin has seemed like a good gambler in the past. A good gambler, though, knows when to fold. 28/28
