Are there different types of causation in neuroscience and biology? What does such a view entail and does scientific work in these fields support it? Answers to these questions should rely on rigorous definitions of causation, but they should also capture the diversity and complexity of causal systems in the world. This talk explores distinctions among causation in these sciences and it provides a theoretical framework for addressing these questions. In capturing distinctions among causation - sometimes referred to as causal diversity and causal pluralism - three types of claims should be distinguished. These concern whether there are different: (1) definitions of causation (2) methods used to establish causation, and (3) causal structures in the world, which are not tied to differences in defining causality. Separating these claims can help researchers examine (i) whether causality is defined in different ways in their field, (ii) if so, whether this is problematic or not, (iii) how methods for establishing causality relate to definitions of it, and (iv) how some types of causal diversity reflect different causal structures, as opposed to different definitions of causation. This framework is draws on mainstream philosophical accounts of causation and examples of causal reasoning in neuroscience and biology.

(From Youtube)