Thread by Madi Kapparov

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How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb.

Or why now the West needs to make it abundantly clear to russia that using nuclear weapons would be met with an overwhelming response.

Here's a game-theoretic explanation with hypothetical payoffs for illustrative purposes. 1/20
Clarifications:
- Academic lingo is used to abstract away from most politics and all emotions.
- This explanation is from the Western perspective. Ukraine will fight no matter what happens. 2/20
Nuclear talks/threats is a game of repeated interactions in the current setting of the russian invasion of Ukraine. We are currently in round 1 or the threats phase. While russia has hopes that their mobilization efforts might yield some results we are in round 1. 3/20
It is critical to understand russia's motivations in this game. Absent a response from the West, it costs nothing to russia to make threats. russia's objective is not to maximize its payoffs but to maximize costs for the West to undermine their resolve in supporting Ukraine. 4/20
russia has already chosen the "nuke threat" action. The West now needs to pick to either respond or not respond. So what are the payoffs for the West? -1 for no response and -2 for a response action. Why? 5/20
My hypothesis behind those payoffs: "Western parochialism and privilege-blindness" as @KuldkeppMart concisely put it, or "our country first, Ukraine second" mentality. Nuclear fear-mongering captivates the minds of the general public in the West. 6/20

A response from the Western government elevates public fears of a "nuclear war" on top of the russian direct threats. So for western democratic systems that care about their constituents' concerns, it is natural to fall into the "no response" option. 7/20
Note that the (-3, -10) cell is unattainable - it requires a threat from the West and no threat from russia. The -3 payoff for the West is associated with reputational damages on top of domestic concerns. 8/20
-10 payoff for russia in case of a Western diplomatic response is related to the West's overwhelming capabilities and reputation to follow through on (most) promises/threats. 9/20
While the "no response" seems like an equilibrium point in round 1, it is the *wrong* option to pick as it sends a signal of a less likely response from the West in round 2 of the game. A tit-for-tat strategy needs to be employed. 10/20
Round 2: russian mobilization efforts are exhausted. The current regime in the kremlin cannot accept a defeat as it would likely spell the end of their rule and subsequently, lives. Nuclear strike considerations become real in russia. 11/20
If the russians expect no response from the West, they are likely to conduct a nuclear strike (assuming their chain of command is infallible). It is unclear how much the russians would gain from it, but judging by Ukraine's resolve it doesn't seem to be much (hence 10). 12/20
russia is also likely to lose support from the "global south" in the international arena as it would become abundantly clear who the aggressor is even to the most ignorant observer. Hence, russia's payoffs would be limited to theater-level gains at most. 13/20
In case of a russian nuclear strike and the West's inaction, the West stands to lose quite a bit in resolve among the general public. Hence, a -50 payoff. It does not necessarily translate into a decrease in the continued Western support for Ukraine. 14/20
If the West chooses to respond we get into the absolute worst-case scenario for russia. The (-50, -100) cell is extremely unlikely (first strike by the West and no response from russia). Nuclear exchange, the (-75, -100) cell, is mutually assured destruction (MAD). 15/20
MAD would lead to a catastrophic cost for russia and a huge negative payoff for the West. The discrepancy is due to a large technological gap between the West and russia. 16/20
Hence, if the West is equally to respond or not to respond in case of a russian nuclear strike, we are likely to end in either MAD or russian strikes limited in Ukraine with no western response. In the latter scenario, the game will proceed into round 3. 17/20
This is why tit-for-tat in round 1 is critical - the russians need to think that a response from the West is a lot more likely than no response, to force the (0,0) cell into being the game equilibrium. Cowing into the russian threats now will lead to a disaster. 18/20
Strong Western response in round 1 might also break the russian chain of command - there will be those who would want to outlive the current regime in the kremlin instead of perishing with them in a nuclear apocalypse. 19/20
If the game proceeds into round 3 (the West does nothing in round 1 and round 2), the implications will be beyond Ukraine and likely to encroach into NATO territory.

Or as @ValeriaFedyk unironically explained it, might as well surrender Alaska now. 20/20

P.S. I just saw a tweet by @berlin_bridge which could be used as a TLDR of the thread:

russia needs to understand *now* that it'll be "net fucked" in case of nuclear weapons use.


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