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There are three intertwined fronts opening in the Russo-Ukrainian War at this time:

1. Bombing of Ukrainian critical infrastructure

2. Deploying Russian troops in Belarus

3. The beginning of sabotage covert operations against targets in Europe, the main target being Germany
Ukraine depends on two main general resources:

1. Its fighting spirit

2. Western military and financial aid

Putin believes that he can diminish the second Ukrainian resource by causing as much economic damage in Europe as possible, which should lead to political strife.
He is using everything at his disposal to achieve this aim: sabotaging infrastructure, threatening nuclear war, energy blackmail, agents of influence, lobbyists, paid media, bought radical parties. His aim is Old Europe, because New Europe is more difficult for him to influence.
I believe Putin plans to go all in this winter, because he can't wage war for another year (he lacks military and political resources, oil & gas revenue will drop bcs of sanctions). He'll try to use conscripted untrained, ill-equipped and badly led forces in a broad offensive.
He is at this moment using nuclear rhetoric as deterrence, so that the West would be divided when he starts his new, and most probably last, attack. He'll try to stretch Ukrainian forces as much as possible, while concentrating what capable troops he has left for a breakthrough.
That's where Belarus comes in. Deploying a smaller part of mobilized troops there, he can again threaten Kyiv from the north, forcing Ukraine to deploy reserves. The fact that the bigger portion of conscripts will lose their lives in this endeavor means nothing to Putin.
Putin has everything riding on this, it's been that way since February 24th. He will not back down, he can only be defeated or the West can gift him victory, there is no third option. He'll consider the use of nuclear weapons as a last resort, only when he faces certain defeat.
Nuclear rhetoric at this point is an instrument of deterrence, because Putin still believes he can achieve victory through conventional means. I don't think he'll choose the cautious option of using conscripts in defense in order to stabilize the front and prolong the war.
Time just isn't on his side. He'll, of course, opt for the cruel strategy of using conscripts as cannon fodder as to overwhelm the Ukrainians on a large front, while the leftovers of his professional army try to counterattack in the provinces Putin claims are annexed.
He no longer believes that he can gain control of the entirety of Ukraine, but he does believe that he can deal a strategic blow to the Ukrainian army and force the peace deal where he walks away with the four Ukrainian provinces and stays in power in Russia.
Not being a military expert and not going into details, it is clear to me that we are entering the final phase of this war. I draw the conclusions from Putin's diminished political, economic and military capabilities, as well as rising anxiety amongst the populace and the elites.
Between the all in option which ends this war one way or the other in the next few months and the cautious option of prolonging the war throughout the next year (possibly even longer), I believe Putin will choose the first one.
Ukraine gets stronger while he gets weaker. Since he doesn't plan on retreating, he'll throw all of his resources into a final offensive while there's still time. The changes in MoD structure should be viewed in this light, because the military leadership is against this move.
Addendum

All of this has nothing to do with the Crimea bridge attack. This is Putin's strategic choice, it's not dictated by everyday events. If there wasn't an attack on the bridge, Ukrainian troops would still be winning the war and Putin will still have to respond to this.
We have confirmation from the Ukrainian intelligence service that today's attack was planned from the beginning of October and was not caused by the attack on Crimea bridge at all. This is Putin's strategy, he's framing it as retaliation for the public.

t.me/DIUkraine/1479
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