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Sharing some overdue thoughts today.
First up: appraisal of the operation under Surovikin’s command, Russia’s transition to the defensive, and the strategy underpinning their strikes on Ukraine’s electrical grid. (/1)
First up: appraisal of the operation under Surovikin’s command, Russia’s transition to the defensive, and the strategy underpinning their strikes on Ukraine’s electrical grid. (/1)
I've observed some differences in the operation since Surovikin was appointed overall commander – mostly a steadier hand. Surovikin is many things, he is not incompetent. He’s probably the most competent commander Russia has put in place so far (/2)
When Surovikin took over in October, the Kharkiv front collapsed, Russia had just ordered mobilization, some Russian officials were considering nuclear use, With too many objectives and too many broken units, the front was in trouble /3) www.nytimes.com/2022/11/02/us/politics/russia-ukraine-nuclear-weapons.html
Surovikin's first task was to move troops across the Dnipro river out of western Kherson, which was done under fire with few Russian casualties. Losing what remained of Russia’s VDV and others would have been not only a morale blow but impacted overall fighting power /4
During that operation, I saw a few predictions on here that the withdrawal across the river would end in a Russian forces’ bloodbath, it did not. Those forces have been moved around to other areas of the front now. /5
The second characteristic I notice under Surovikin’s command is better prepared positions. Surovikin ordered network of trenches and defensive positions to be built in many areas, as Russia transitions to an overall defensive position through the winter. /6 @ISW 
Surovikin’s Operational Group South was the only sector that seemed to properly prepare a network of positions, so he’s bringing this style with him as commander. These lines were noticed by Ukrainian forces and some said it made counteroffensives difficult. /7
Third: the precision strike campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure is terrible and it is effective, impacting water and electricity for millions of Ukrainians. Unfortunately, these concepts are cooked into some aspects of Russian military strategy..../8
Highly recommend this CNA report if you want to learn more about strikes on critical infrastructure /9
www.cna.org/reports/2021/10/russian-military-strategy-core-tenets-and-concepts
www.cna.org/reports/2021/10/russian-military-strategy-core-tenets-and-concepts
In Russian strategy, strikes against critical infrastructure (and other mil targets) happen at the start of war for weeks-month+ before ground forces are committed. didn’t happen here likely due to political decisions, i.e., Moscow assuming it could install a new govt. /10
For more reading on the Initial Period of War, check out this new @RANDCorporation report from Clint Reach, Alexis Blanc, and @sovietologist /11 www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1233-1.html
I think about an article that appeared in Vooruzhenie i Ekonomika in 2021 discussing attacks on a country’s “anthropogenic shell” – life support systems like sewage, water-treatment, power plants, train stations, local government and so on .. /12
As this and other Russian articles like it suggest, damaging civilian critical infrastructure will create destabilizing waves of refugees and grind the government's functioning to a halt – their sought after 'secondary effects'. /13
Russia is firing larger batches of missiles against Ukraine and try to confuse and overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses. Ukraine is getting NASAMS and IRIS-T, but these attacks draw down Ukrainian interceptor stockpiles. /14
If you consider this as an RS alternate approach to SEAD (suppression of enemy air defenses), it is very troubling. If Ukraine’s SAMs are depleted, the Russian VKS can come back in with more deep strikes. /15 rusi.org/news-and-comment/in-the-news/ukraine-risk-running-out-air-defenses-analysts-say
It’s possible that Surovikin is providing more accurate assessments to the Kremlin. Putin’s recent speech shows that he understands for now, his diminished military prospects and that the operation may take a long time and have problems. /16 www.rferl.org/a/putin-ukaine-occupation-nuclear-wa-eapons-zelenskiy/32166510.html
According to Putin, 25% mobilized forces are in combat units, 25% in rear positions, while 50% train in Russia. Suggests some type of rotation scheme is in place for the winter inside the zone, and some forces may be in longer-term training. /17
In sum, Surovikin is shoring up Russia’s defensive positions with resources he has. Under his command the precision strike campaign is harmful to Ukraine. He may be relaying news accurately to Putin. Relaying disappointing news can be dangerous over there./end
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Jason Scott Montoya @JasonSMontoya
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Dec 14, 2022