Instead of trying to encircle Bakhmut and slowly taking it, the Russian High command seems to have decided to launch a frontal attack on the city itself, proving my suspicion that Putin wants the city as fast as possible even when this means highest rate of own casualties. 1/8

It is the Russian version of shock and awe where everything is thrown into the meat grinder in order to overwhelm the enemy because there is no better option. This tactic is as reckless as it is desperate. You chose this only when you have a very limited time window. 2/8

I believe that the haste comes from two reasons.

1.) The Russian reserves are limited. You cannot sustain such a high intensity operation for a long time.

2.) Winter hasn't fully arrived yet. The Russian army is not ready for it. A snow storm would scythe them entirely. 3/5

Putin assumes that if he can achieve a victory in Bakhmut that it can be presented to the Russian people while also offering the operational pause from a position of (perceived) strength. It would also serve as Potemkin village for the devastating defeats of the last months. 4/8

Putin's problem, however, is that this is extremely risky. Bakhmut is not only heavily fortified but also easy to supply from West and North. The city could be effectively defended even if the East and South falls to the Russian advance. 5/8

If Ukrainians delay them long enough then both problems will catch up. Russians will run out of troops, ammunition, and will be caught by the winter, similar to what happened to the German troops in Moscow in December 1941. Temperatures will fall in 7 days, considerably. 6/8

But even when we assume that Russians might take Bakhmut, what would be the aftermath? If Ukrainians do not accept a ceasefire then Russian troops would find themselves instantly being forced to defend their hardly taken city. It is unlikely that they would be able to do that.7/8

Bottom line is that whether Russians will or will not take Bakhmut that it won't improve their situation. In the contrary, the waste of their troops and reserves will hamper them to effectively defend the occupied areas, opening up more counteroffensives as witnessed before. 8/8